A translation of Thompson’s reconstructed Shen Dao text

(This piece is part of a larger project organized around the Daodejing). 

Shen Dao was a Hundred Schools philosopher resident at the Jixia Academy in Qi sometime before 300 BC. We have almost no biographical information about him; even his dates are a matter of guesswork. The author of the Tianxia chapter of Zhuangzi discussed him sympathetically (though critically), Xunzi criticized him harshly, and Xunzi’s student Han Feizi credited as as one of three masters of Legalism, along with Shang Yang and Shen Buhai. So we can be sure that he existed, at least, and was not one of the many legendary or apocryphal philosophers who show up in histories of that era.

The Hundred Schools was perhaps the most fertile era in the history of Chinese philosophy, but history has not been kind to its texts and many figures are known only as names or by a few anecdotes. In the case of Shen Dao, the available material consists of a late and corrupt text called the Shenzi, the three philosophical discussions mentioned above, and scattered quotations and anecdotes of widely differing value.

In 1979 P. M. Thompson published The Shen Tzu Fragments, a meticulously worked-out attempt to separate the actual words of Shen Dao from the legendary and pseudoepigraphical accretions. For reasons of his own, however, when Thompson published his textual reconstruction he chose not to publish the translation which was part of the PhD dissertation from which his book was taken. As a result, the recovered Shen Dao text has so far been available only to those who can read classical Chinese.

About the Translation

Thompson’s recovered text consists of 126 passages of varying length, divided on the basis of their textual origin into 20 sections (#1-123, which includes only 121 sections because of Thompson’s late deletion of #93 and #94 as spurious), followed by a 5-passage appendix (AP1-AP5.) The first seven sections (67 passages) consist of the passages from the seven chapters of the traditional Shenzi which Thompson accepted as valid, and these read quite coherently in the sequence in which they appear. The remaining 59 passages (from 16 different sources) are quite diverse. A number of them are clearly relevant to the Shenzi material, but there are also many aphorisms and brief scraps of biographical material whose significance is uncertain.

My translation is intended for the reader of English and is more readerly than scholarly. My intention is to bring Shen Dao’s ideas and some of his literary qualities over into English, and in order to do this I have slid past a few difficult textual questions and have translated out some of the specifics of Chinese culture — catties become pounds, kings are enthroned rather than elevated, gambling is done with dice rather than with belt buckles, and so on. Everything has been checked against Thompson’s unpublished dissertation translation:  I note the places where I deviate significantly from Thompson or where I follow his translation even though I have trouble construing the Chinese.

The original Shenzi (Thomson’s #1 — #67) was divided into seven chapters which are here numbered I – VII. I have further divided Chapter I into groups A, B, C, and D and Chapter III into Groups F and G. Chapter II is group E, and Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII are Groups H, I, J, and K respectively. Group L consists of Thompson’s #75-#79, which I treat as a conclusion because it seems to work as one (a decision which is not, however, textually justified). The remaining passages (#68-#74,  #80-123, and AA1-AA5) are either interspersed where they seem to fit in Groups A-L, or else put into Group M (called “Leftovers”) which amounts to about 10% of the total and consists of passages I wasn’t able to make much use of — specifically nos. 69, 72, 74, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 104, 105, 106, 108, 110, 112, 115, 116, 117, 122, and 123, and AA 1, AA2, and AA3 from the appendix.

The translation shows the original chapter divisions I-VII, my own divisions A-M, and Thompson’s passage numbers 1-123 and AA1-AA5. With a letter plus a number any passage can be located either in my translation or in Thompson’s text. Section B, for example, consists of #7-15 plus #113, #118-119, and AA3 – AA4. “B-113” would thus locate #113 both in Thompson’s sequence and in my rearranged text, and “B-AA3” would locate AA3.

The Chinese Text Project has posted a Chinese text of Shen Dao. I haven’t compared carefully, but it seems to be the same as the Thompson version up until fragment #43 at the bottom. I don’t know the sources of #44-#60; they aren’t the “Unidentified items in the pseudo Shen Tzu” published by Thompson.

Chinese text of Shen Dao.

Criticisms and corrections are welcome.

I

威　德

Respect Virtue

A. Impartiality and wu-wei

#1-#6

1: Heaven has light and does not care that men are in darkness; Earth is fruitful, and does not care that men are impoverished; the sage (聖) has virtue (德) and does not care that men are imperiled.

2: Although Heaven does not care that men are in darkness, if they open their doors and windows, they will assuredly get light for themselves; but Heaven does nothing (無事).

3: Although the Earth does not care that men are impoverished, if they cut down the trees and harvest the plants, they will assuredly get wealth for themselves; but Earth does nothing.

4: Although the Sage does not care that men are imperiled, if the people (百姓) conform to the superior and accept their lower status, they will assuredly get peace for themselves; but the Sage does nothing.

5: The Sage in high position does not harm (不害) men, though he cannot keep men from harming each other. It is the people themselves who eliminate the harm.

6: The Sage possesses the world (天下 = “Empire”) as something he has been given, not as something he has taken; the people take care of the sage, and are not cared for by him; for the sage does nothing.

*Laozi Ch.5: Heaven is not humane: it treats the myriad creatures as straw dogs. The sage is not humane: he treats the people as straw dogs.  Xunzi also stresses the indifference of Heaven and Earth to human concerns.

“Does nothing” translates the phrase wushi, 無事, which has much the same meaning as wuwei 無為.

The Sage in high position does not harm (不害) men.  Buhai 不害 “does not harm” is Shen Buhai’s given name. In chapter 60 of Laozi it is said that when the Empire follows Dao the spirits 鬼神 do not harm men, nor does the Sage harm men; in Laozi 81, it is said that the Way of Heaven benefits and does not harm.

In the Nei Ye chapter of Guanzi (thought to be from the same tradition as Laozi; p. 75, Roth) it is said that the sage is not harmed by men nor vulnerable to other harm; sageliness is identified with the vital essence 精, which is manifested in the world as the spirits, and in men as sageliness.

The Sage thus seems to represent the absence of harm where harm might be expected, and I believe that the Confucian and Daoist sages historically trace back to powerful exorcists and shamans who could control the spirits and who were capable of either benefiting or harming men. More here.

B.  Vehicles and helpers

#7 – #15

7: Mao Qiang and Xi Shi were the loveliest women in the world. If they had been dressed in demon garb, passersby would have fled from them; if they had changed into fine black linen, passersby would have gathered to look at them.

8: From this we can see that fine black linen helps women be beautiful: if lovely women fail to wear it, their beauty will not please.

9: If porters can cross mountain valleys and walk hundreds of miles through the wilderness, it’s because they salve their feet; if the porters fail to salve their feet, their feet will be hurt.

10: Thus:

The serpent soars with the mists,

the dragon rides the clouds;

but if the mist and the clouds clear, 

they both become crawling worms:

because they’ve lost their vehicle (乘).

11: Thus, if a worthy (賢) bows down to mediocre man (不肖)　it’s because the worthy’s authority (權) is not weighty ; if a mediocre man submits to a worthy, it’s because the worthy’s position (位) is lofty.

12: When the sage Yao was a peasant, he could not govern even his neighborhood; but when the villain Jie was Emperor, he could disorder the whole world.

13: From this we can see that worth (賢) is not enough to make the multitude obey, whereas strategic advantage (勢) and high position are enough to make even the worthies submit.

*“Authority / strategic advantage” 勢 and “power” 權 are key terms in Chinese philosophy. The translations here are adequate for this passage but don’t capture the full meaning of either term.

14: Thus, if a nobody (無名) is making decisions, it’s because his authority (勢) is weighty; if a weak crossbow shoots high, it’s because the bolt is carried by wind; and if a man is mediocre (不肖) but his orders bring results, it’s because the multitude (眾) is helping (助) him.

*When a nobody [nameless person] is making decisions: See F 87 where it is said When Dao is supreme, names do not dazzle. “Name” often means “fame” and can also mean “from an eminent family”.  In a well-ordered state reputation and family connections will not get you a government job.  

15: Thus, if you carry heavy loads and climb high you are careful about the salve. If you love an infant you are careful about its nurse. If you cross mountain passes and travel far you are careful about your coach. With the help (助) you need, you succeed; without it you fail.

16: The reason why the virtue of the Three Emperors and the Five Hegemons matched that of Heaven and Earth, reached the ghosts and the spirits, and embraced all living creatures was that their helpers (助) were many.

*See Shen Dao I : 56: A white fox-fur coat is not made of the fur of a single fox.

113: A state has protocols to distinguish the noble (貴) from the commoner (賤), but not to distinguish the worthy from the mediocre; there are protocols distinguishing young from the old, but none distinguishing the brave from the cowardly; there are protocols distinguishing near from distant kin, but none distinguishing the loved from the hated.

118: A tripod in Yan weighs thousands of pounds, but loaded on a Wu boat it can cross the water. What bears it up is “the floating road”.

119: To reach Yue while sitting down, you need a boat. To reach Qin while standing still you need a chariot. Qin and Yue are far away; what makes it possible to sit at ease and arrive there is a mechanical device.

A3-4: Yao taught at Lishu and the people did not listen, but when he reached the throne and ruled the empire, his commands were followed and his prohibitions were respected. By this we know that position and strategic advantage are enough to rely upon, and that worth and wisdom do not deserve reverence.

C. Responsibilities

#17-#23

17: In ancient times, craftsmen had only one trade and officials (士) held only one position. With craftsmen practicing only one trade, the specific tasks are few, and if tasks are few, the trade is easy to master. If officials hold only one office, the specific responsibilities (職) are few, and if the responsibilities are few, the position’s demands are easy to satisfy. Thus official positions could be passed down in the family, and crafts could be made standard   (常).

18: The sons of the craftsmen became competent without schooling, not because they were born skilful, but because the crafts had been made standard (常).

*Confucius, Analects, VIII-14 Do not concern yourself with matters of government unless they are a responsibility of your office.

Shen Buhai 22: The governmental responsibilities of an official do not extend past the office to which he has been appointed. Even though he may know about matters outside his sphere, he should not talk about them (Creel p. 383).

19: But today, the state has no standard Dao, and the officials have no standard rule (法); thus the state steadily falls into confusion.

20: Though their training is good, the officials cannot fulfill their responsibilities; if the officials cannot fulfill their responsibilities, the principles (理) of government are lost; when the principles of government are lost, people look to the worthies (賢) and the wise (智); if the worthies and the wise are honored, the state’s major decisions are left to the discretion of a single man.

21: Of old, emperors were not enthroned and honored in order to reward a single man. It is said:

If the world does not have one man who is the most honored, then there will be no way for the basic principles (理) to be proclaimed. The basic principles are proclaimed for the sake of the world.

22. So the emperor is enthroned for sake of the empire; the empire is not established for the sake of the emperor. A prince is enthroned for the sake of a state; a state is not established for the sake of the prince. Officials are established for the sake of their offices; offices are not established for the sake of the officials.

23. Even bad laws are preferable to no laws at all.

D. Standards

#24-#27

24: Lots are drawn to divide up property, and dice are thrown to distribute horses, not because the lots and the dice are fair, but so that those who get the better shares have no one to thank (德), and those who got the worse shares have no one to blame. That way resentment and presumption (望 = “hope”) do not arise.

25: The discerning ruler must initiate projects and assign responsibilities only according to aptitude; he must judge crimes and distribute property only according to rule (法); and he must show generosity (德) and exert control only according to protocol (禮).

26: Thus personal desires will not disrupt the state calendar, and favoritism will not violate the rule; honors will not exceed the limits, and rewards will not surpass those due the position; the officers will not hold multiple offices, and the craftsman will not practice two trades.

27: If tasks are assigned according to ability, and rewards given according to the tasks completed, the superior will not bestow excessive rewards and the subjects will not enjoy excessive wealth.

70: The division of deeds and the joining of contract tallies are followed both by the worthy and by the mediocre. If you have these objects, you do not need good faith(信).

*See also J 63. In ancient China each party of a contract held one half of a tally stating the mutual obligations, and the two tallies fit together like lock and key, or like pieces of a puzzle.

73: Thus divination is the means by which a public (公) understanding is established; scales are the means by which a public measure is established; written documents are the means by which public good faith is established; units of length and volume are the means by which public criteria are established; legal procedures and books of protocol are the means by which public justice is established. In every case a public (公) form is established, and private (私) codes rejected.

102: If there are scales you cannot be cheated about heavy and light; if there are yardsticks, you cannot be cheated about long and short; with rules and standards, you cannot be tricked by sophistry and fakery.

120: If calibrating heavy weights, if the great Yu were asked to correct them to a fraction of an ounce, he could not be sure that they were accurate; but if they were put on a balance, no one would go wrong by as much as a hair. There is no need to wait for an intelligence as great as Yu’s; the intelligence of the most ordinary man is sufficient for this.

*Shen Buhai 3: The ruler must have discriminating methods and correct and definite principles, just as one suspends a weight on a balance in order to weigh lightness and heaviness; by this means you unify the assembly of ministers. (Creel p. 352-3.)

II

因循

Accommodation

E. Self interst

#28-#32

28: It’s the Way of Heaven that accommodation (因) leads to great results, whereas reformation (化) leads to paltry results. “Accommodation” means accommodating human reality (人情).

29: All men act for their own interests (自為). If you try to reform them (化) to instead act for your interest, there will be no one you can successfully employ.

30: Thus the ancient kings did not appoint anyone who would not accept pay, and in adversity did not rely on anyone whom they did not pay well.

31: If men do not get what they themselves want, their superiors will not be able to employ them successfully.

32: If I rely on men’s working for themselves, and not on their working for me, I can employ any man. This is what is called “accommodation”.

*Shen Buhai 1-9: “The ruler’s method is complete acquiescence (因). He merges his own concerns with the public good, so that as an individual he does not act  (無事: Creel, p. 352).

“Human realities” is used for人情 here instead of “human nature” because “human nature” 人性 is a major topic in Chinese philosophy, and what Shen Dao writes here uses a different term and is not part of that discussion.

In his “Background of the Mencian theory of human nature” A.C. Graham argues that 情, now “passions and emotions”, originally meant something like “inner reality”. The translation “human feelings” would be OK too; human feelings are a human reality.

99: If a family is rich distant relatives arrive; if a family is poor brothers live apart. It’s not that they don’t love one another, but that their wealth is not enough to include them all.

101: When the sea and the mountain fight for water, the sea always wins.

*This is a recurring theme in Laozi, often marked with the word “stillness” 靜. Mozi: Therefore the big rivers do not despise the little brooks as tributaries. (Ch. I, “Qin Shi”). Shang Yang: For people’s attitude toward profit is just like the tendency of water to flow downwards, without preference for any of the four sides (Book V: 23, Duyvendak tr. P. 316).

Shen Dao’s may be the first statement of this common theme (the Mozi chapter is eclectic and probably late). Confucius and Mencius thought quite differently about low-lying areas, which is where filth gathers.

103: A coffinmaker is not bothered by death; where there’s profit, uncleanness is forgotten.

III

民雜

The people are various

F. Skills

#33-#37

33: The people (民) in their various circumstances all have their own abilities, and these abilities are not the same. This is the nature of the people.

34: The greatest of rulers take care of (畜) all their subjects; the subjects’ capacities are various, and all of them are useful to the sovereign.

35: So the great ruler accepts (因) the people’s capacities as his material (資), and treasures (苞 = 葆) and cares for (畜) all of them without favoring or rejecting any.

36: The great ruler does not have a just one criterion for what he looks for in men, so everything he finds is good enough.

37: The great ruler is not selective, and his subjects are all good enough; because he is not selective, becoming his subject is easy; since becoming his subject is easy, none will be excluded; if none is excluded, the subjects will be many. A ruler with many subjects is called a high sovereign.

* Thompson (p. 527) recognizes the relationship between Shen Tao F 35 and chapter 27 of Laozi: Hence the sage is always good at saving people, and so abandons no one…. the bad man is the material 資 for the good man.

See also Laozi Ch. 61: Thus all the great state wants is to care for 畜 men” (my tr.) and Laozi Ch. 62: “[Tao] is the treasure 葆 bao of the good man and that by which the bad man is protected 保 bao…. Even if a man is not good, should he be abandoned?  It seems likely to me that Laozi draws on Shenzi here.

68: In channeling water you raise the embankments and remove the blockages — even among the barbarians it is the same. You learn this from water, not from the Great Yu.

71: Li Zhu’s eyesight was so sharp that he could distinguish the tip of a hair at more than a hundred paces; but beyond one foot he couldn’t tell if water was shallow or deep. This was not because his eyes were not sharp, but because the circumstances made it hard to see.

86: The Dao of employing the worthy does not leave out the mediocrity out; the Dao of employing the intelligent does not leave out the dull.

87: When this is the case then Dao may be said to be supreme. When Dao is supreme, names (名) do not dazzle.

*See also B 14. “Names” refers to fame and family status, which ideally do not influence hiring.)

114: Gongshu Zi was a skilled woodworker, but even he could not make a lute out of spindlewood.

G.

The Role of the Prince

#38-#45

38: The Dao of the prince and the minister: the minister performs his task and the prince has no task; the prince is relaxed and happy and the minister takes on the labor; the minister uses all his knowledge and strength to perform his job satisfactorily, and the prince does not share in the labor, but merely waits for the job to be finished. As a result, every task is taken care of. The correct way of government is thus.

39: When a ruler of men takes tasks onto himself and competes in benevolence (善) with his subordinate officials, he encroaches on the officials’ responsibilities, and the officials become lax.

40: Thus it is said:

If the ruler of men contests with his subordinates in benevolence, then the subordinates will not dare to compete with the prince’s efforts.

41: In such a case every subordinate will try to avoid attention by hiding things he knows, and if there is an error the minister shifts the blame to the prince. This is the way of disobedience and chaos.

41: My translation diverges from Thompson’s here and like his is slightly conjectural.

42: The prince’s understanding need not be the most excellent. If his understanding is not the most excellent but tries himself to do everything for his subjects, he will be insufficient to the task.

43: But even supposing that the prince’s understanding were the best of all, for a prince singlehandedly to take on all the subordinate responsibilities would be toilsome; toil leads to fatigue, fatigue leads to exhaustion, which then brings him again to insufficiency.

44: Thus if a ruler of men takes tasks on himself and does the job in person, the ministers will not do their jobs. Ruler and minister have switched places; this is called “topsy-turvy”. When things are topsy-turvy, chaos follows.

45: The ruler of men assigns tasks to his ministers and does not himself work; the ministers do the work. This is the normal pattern of prince-minister relations and marks the difference between order and chaos. We cannot fail to attend to this principle.

*Shen Buhai 1-4, 1-7, and 17-1 (Creel pp. 346-8, 350, and 367-70) are too long to cite here but make many of these points.

107: To reject Tao and rules (法) and ignore standards and measures, and seek through a single man’s wisdom to understand the world – whose mind would be capable of doing this?

*Shen Buhai 17-2: By what can I know that he is deaf? By the keenness of his ears. By what can I know that he is blind? By the clarity of his sight (Creel, pp. 383-4).

111: In ancient times the Emperor was able to dress himself, but his chamberlains would put on his robes; he was able to walk, but his master of protocol would lead the guests in; he was able to speak, but his diplomatic representatives would proclaim his words. As a consequence, his actions and court speech were never in error.

121: The relationship between a ruler and his minister is like a balance. If the left arm is light the right is heavy, if right arm is light the left is heavy. The light and the heavy are mutually defining; this is a principle of Heaven and Earth.

IV

知忠

Understanding loyalty

H. Dedication

#46-#56

46: The ministers of a doomed state during a disordered era are not necessarily disloyal ministers; the ministers of a well-ordered state who bring renown to their prince are not necessarily all devotedly loyal (忠).

47: The men of a well-ordered state are not all loyal to their prince; the men of a disordered era are not all treacherous. Either in a well-ordered or in a disordered era, both loyal and treacherous men are to be found.

48: In every age there have been ministers who intended to serve loyally, but whose princes could not rest easy on their thrones. Even princes with ministers as courageously loyal as Pi Kan or Wu Tzu-hsu went to their deaths amid darkness, infamy and evil.

49: This shows us that loyalty is not enough to save a chaotic age, but instead can be something that multiplies its problems. How do we know that this is so? It is said:

A father had a worthy son, but Shun banished Gusou;

Jie had loyal ministers, but crime filled the empire.

50: And

An obedient son is not born to an indulgent father,

Loyal ministers do not arise under a sage prince.

51: When an enlightened prince employs his officials, their diligence (忠) is not allowed to go beyond their assigned tasks, and their assigned tasks do not go beyond those of their office. In this way their errors can be individually remedied, and subordinates do not dare to aggrandize themselves by their benevolence (善).

*My interpretation here is significantly different than Thompson’s. I am not confident of In this way their errors can be individually remedied.

52: When the officers assigned to their positions abide by the rule and do not dare to exceed or fall short of their assigned tasks, and when with impartial and correct diligence they obediently and harmoniously serve their superiors, perfect order can be attained.

88: Overeager officeholders are 賤 unworthy.

53: If a prince brings his state to ruin, it’s not just the error of a single man; if a prince brings his state to order, it’s not just the effort of a single man.

54: The ordering of disorder lies in worthy (賢) officers accepting their assignments, and not in their loyalty (忠). Thus:

If wisdom fills the world, prosperity comes to the prince;

if loyalty fills the world, harm comes to the state.

55: Thus Yao could not have survived what destroyed Jie, but is credited with unsurpassed goodness while Jie’s name is notorious for all-pervading evil. One was served well by his men, and the other was not.

56: Thus the timber in the Great Hall of State is not cut from a single tree; a white fox-fur coat is not made of the fur of a single fox; and order and disorder, security and peril, glory and disgrace do not come from the efforts of one man.

* Mozi, “Qin Shi”: The fur coat that is worth a thousand yi is not composed of the white fur of a single fox. (This early chapter of Mozi is eclectic and probably late.) See also B14 above.

This shows us that loyalty is not enough to save a chaotic age, but instead can be something that multiplies its problems….If loyalty fills the world, harm comes to the state.  

忠 is usually translated “loyalty”. That is often but not always its meaning (see Goldin, 2008). In many contexts it means something like “conscientious” or “diligent” or “attentive”. In my opinion the best single translation is “dedication / dedicated”, which overlaps with conscientiousness and loyalty.

The general point being made is not dependent on the translation:  The problem with loyalty / diligence is that it cannot save a badly-ordered state, so that if such a state relies on loyal or heroically diligent ministers to save it, it will fail. (Laozi 18:When the state has fallen into confusion and disorder, then there are loyal ministers.)

A well-run state does not need to rely on exceptional efforts: if ordinary men correctly do their assigned tasks, that will be enough. And if a state does rely on heroic effort, that is a sign that it is in trouble.

This statement is puzzling: The ordering of disorder lies in worthy (賢) officers accepting their assignments. Shen Dao generally rejects moralizing theories of government which stress personal character and talk about worthies 賢, reliability 信, and loyalty / dedication 忠.

V

德立

Virtue Established

I. Ownership

#57-#60

57: An Emperor is crowned so that the Great Lords will not doubt (疑) his status; a great lord is crowned so that the lesser nobles will not doubt his status; the primary wife is established so that the concubines will not doubt her status; the crown prince is established so that the sons of concubines will not doubt his status. Where there is doubt there will be instability; where there are two contenders there will be trouble; where there are many contenders there will be harm. Trouble comes from sharing, but not from sole possession.

58: Thus, two men share an appointment, the state must fall into chaos. If two ministers share an appointment without throwing the state into chaos it will be because the prince is still alive. Order depends on the prince; without him there would be chaos.

59: If two sons are of the highest status, the house must fall into chaos. If two sons are of the highest status and the house does not fall into chaos it will because the parents are still alive. Order depends on the parents; without them there would be chaos.

60: If a minister covets (疑) his lord’s position, the state will necessarily be endangered. If a concubine’s son contends for the succession, the house must necessarily be endangered.

*Thompson translates an emended version of #57, but I think that the original “doubt” 疑 is good enough. Hanfeizi XVII: 44 develops these ideas at length (tr. Liao, “On Assumers”, pp. 216- 229). “Covet” really is the idea, and I translated it that way in one place.

Shen Buhai 1-1 seems to make the opposite point: When one wife gains excessive influence with the husband, all the wives are thrown into disorder. (Creel, p.343).

Shen Dao is talking about the unique certainty of succession, whereas Shen Buhai is talking about one wife’s or one minister’s monopoly of influence, but there’s still a disagreement. (In 17-5, p. 377 Shen Buhai seems to speak favorably of Guanzi’s total control of Duke Huan’s government, apparently contradicting his statement in 1-1).

98: If two are equally honorable, neither will serve the other; if two are equally humble neither will work for the other.

*Shen Buhai 10: Those whose intelligence is equal cannot command each other; those whose strength is equal cannot overcome each other. (Creel, p. 360).

109: There can be many worthies, but there cannot be many rulers; there can be no worthies, but there cannot be no ruler.

*In the beginning of human life, when there was yet no law and no government, the custom was “everyone according to his own justice”. Accordingly each man had his own idea of justice, two men had two different ideas and ten men had ten different ideas – the more people, the more different ideas. (Mozi, Ch. 11, Shang Tong I, p. 110; I have adapted Mei’s translation.)

82: If a rabbit runs down the street, a hundred men will chase it: while one rabbit is not enough for a hundred men, ownership (分, lit. “division, portion”) has not yet been assigned. If ownership is unknown, even the sage king Yao would run after it, and how much more so the multitude? But if rabbits are heaped in the market, passersby don’t even look: it’s not that they don’t like rabbit, it’s that ownership has been established. If ownership has been assigned, even an idiot won’t grab one. From ruling the empire down to a state, the establishment of ownership is all you need.

VI

君人

Prince and Subject

J. Favoritism

#61-#67

61: If the ruler of men ignores the law and governs in person, then punishment and reward, exactions and grants are decided according to the ruler’s moods. Thus, someone who has been properly rewarded will still hope (望) for more, and someone who has been justly punished will always hope (望) for remission.

62: If the prince ignores the rule (法) and personally assigns merit and demerit according to his mood, then identical services will receive differing rewards, and identical offenses will receive differing punishments. This breeds grievances.

63: So when lots are used when dividing up horses, and dice are used when apportioning land, it’s not because the lots and the dice are wiser than men, but because this is a way to exclude favoritism and preclude grievances.

64: Thus it is said:

The great prince relies on rules (法) and does not act on his own; cases are decided by rule.

65: When the rules are applied, with each receiving his allotted reward or punishment, no one hopes for anything (望) the prince. Therefore grievances do not arise and the ruler and his subjects are in harmony.

*On dividing by lot, see Group D above. On望, see B 24.

VII

君臣

Prince and Minister

K. Discretion

#66-#67

66: The ruler of men does not listen to many voices; he relies on rules and methods to survey advantages and disadvantages.

67: Do not listen to unlawful advice; do not honor unlawful labors. Do not appoint lazy relatives to office, and do not let officials favor their own relatives: the law sould not recognize affection and attachments. The avoidance of problems between high and low comes only from law.

*See Shen Buhai 23-24, Creel pp. 370-1.

100: A proverb says

Without sharp eyesight and acute hearing, you cannot be Emperor;

without deafness and blindness, you cannot rule justly. 

*Mencius V B-1: Po Yi would neither look at improper sights with his eyes nor listen to improper sounds with his ears.

Shen Buhai 1-5: Therefore the skillful ruler avails himself of an appearance of stupidity…. He hides his motives and covers his tracks (Creel, p. 348-349).

Shen Buhai 16: If the ruler’s intelligence is displayed, men will prepare against it; if his lack of intelligence is displayed, they will delude him (Creel, p. 364-6).

Both Shens advise the ruler to be aloof. Shen Dao is warning the ruler not only against paying attention to inappropriate requests, but also not to get lost in the weeds of detail. Shen Buhai’s first passage warns against micromanagement, but the second and third passages recommend that the ruler be secretive in order to prevent presumption and scheming (Shen Dao makes these points in K61, K67 and D24.)

L. Conclusion

(This is not really the conclusion textually speaking, but it seems to work like one.)

#75-#79

75: The greatest accomplishment of law is to prevent the advancement of private interests  (私); the greatest accomplishment of the prince is to prevent conflict among the people.

76: Yet today those who establish the laws also advance private interest. This means that private interests contend with the law, which is a greater disorder than having no law. Those who establish the prince also honor the worthies. This means that the worthies contend with the prince, which is worse than having no prince.

77: In a state following Dao, the law is established so that private benevolence (私善) does not develop; the prince is established so that the worthies are not honored; the people are united with the prince, and cases are decided according to law. This the great way of states.

78: Thus a state governed without law falls into chaos; law maintained unadapted (不變) leads to decline; the pursuit of private interests within the law is called lawlessness.

79: Those who use their strength in the service of the law are the common people (百姓); those who defend the law to the death are the officeholders　(有司); the one who adapts the law according to Dao is the ruler and leader (君長.)

*Those who establish the prince also honor the worthies. This means that the prince contends with the worthies, which is worse than having no prince. This is one of the key points made by the Legalists against the Confucians. In public service, too much is as bad as not enough — as Confucius also said. “Worthies” are ambitious and competitive, devoted to the pursuit of honor and reputation and reluctant to limit themselves to a specific assigned task.

A worthy in government service might use government funds to benefit the people, thus depriving the government of revenue while gaining himself a reputation for benevolence. (This is the private benevolence 私善 spoken of). When this happens, the ruler has lost control of government (勢), and in the worst case the worthy relies on his popularity to usurp the throne. (The Zhou dynasty was founded exactly this way.)

Shang Yang II:7: The benevolent always take concern for others as their aim, but the worthy make it their way to excel each other….When they established a ruler, elevating worth was abandoned for honoring rank. (Duyvendak tr. P. 226; Graham, Disputers of the Dao, p. 272; my adapted translation).

Laozi 3: Do not honor men of worth, so that the people do not contend. 19: Make the selfish interests 私 few. 75 and 77 the worthy is also seen as competitive; this competition is renounced in 77.

M. Leftovers

(These 28 passages, mostly very short, are included here for completeness; they comprise about 10% of the whole. Some are isolated facts, some are truisms, and some are enigmas. They deserve further study, at this point their relevance to the rest of Shen Dao is uncertain to me. In several cases I am doubtful about my translations).

69 Tian Pian’s personal name was named Guang.

72 Yao offered to abdicate to Xu You, and Shun offered to abdicate to Shan Zhuan, but both declined to become Emperor and retreated to live as peasants.

74 Ceremonial protocols follow custom, administration follows the sovereign, ambassadors follow the prince.

80 Cang Jie lived earlier than Fu Xi.

81 The maker of mud-boards maintains that muddy roads are calamitous.

83 When beasts hide they go into the weeds.

84 The virtue essence (德精) is subtle and invisible, acute and inexhaustible. Thus external things do not clog its interior.

85 The world exalts gentlemen of strict virtue.

89 Servants keep their mouths shut, attendants bite their tongues.

90 If you remain free of error for a long while, the general public will finally pay attention to you.

91 Of old during the decline of the Zhou dynasty Emperor Li led the empire into chaos, and the Great Lords violently attacked one another, each wanting to appropriate the other’s land.

92 That the many will overcome the few is a certainty

93-94 [Deleted by Thompson]

95 Duke Zhuang of Lu was casting a great bell, and Cao Gui went before him and said “Your state is small but your bell is large; why did you not consider this?”

96 An ordinary man supports himself by his strength, a superior man supports himself by the Dao.

97 The Book of Poetry is past aspirations; the Book of History is past exhortations; the Qun-Qiu Annals are past actions.

104 A state which keeps armed men will inevitably have desertions from the battlefield.

105 “We can round men up in the marketplace and fight” – this means that arms which make the state secure are not raised up in rancor.

106 If the strong harm the capable, there will be chaos; if those thought capable harm those who are less capable, there will be chaos.

108 In the penal code of the Yu dynasty, the drawing of strange designs on the face represented the staining of facial incisions; the wearing of a hatstring made of washed mourning cloth represented the cutting off of the nose; the wearing of grass sandals represented the amputation of the feet; the cutting off of a piece of the front-skirt represented castration; a hemp-cloth jacket without a collar represented capital punishment. Such was the penal code of the Yu dynasty.

111 Where the river comes down through the Dragon Gates, its current is as fast as a bamboo arrow; even four horses in hot pursuit cannot over take it.

112 If one possesses courage one does not act in anger but behaves as though one were cowardly.

115 Confucius said : When I, Qiu, was young I loved study, and when old heard the Dao; it is for this reason that his knowledge was comprehensive.

116 Confucius said: The great Yu neither rewarded nor punished; the Xia Dynasty rewarded but did not punish; the Shang dynasty punished and did not reward; the Zhou dynasty both rewarded and punished. Punishments prevent action, and rewards encourage action.

117 Among punishments, to cut off men’s limbs or pierce their flesh is mutilation; to mark their caps or alter their robes is called shaming. In previous ages shame was used and the people did not rebel; in the present age punishments are used and the people do not obey.

122 Water is produced by one who drinks beyond measure. Gluttony is produced in one who eats beyond measure.

123 No tasks in the daytime, no dreams at night.

A1 To know is not to know: despise knowledge and work to destroy it and get rid of it.

A2 Just attain the mindlessness of a thing, and avoid sageliness and eminence; a clod does not depart from the Dao.

A5 A carpenter might know how to make a door, but if he made one that opened but wouldn’t shut, he wouldn’t know doors.

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